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VESTING RETIREMENT BENEFITS: REVISITING
YARD-MAN AND ITS UNACKNOWLEDGED
PRESUMPTION
RAYMOND A. FRANKLIN*
What started out as a potential inference became an omnipresent
presumption and now appears to have become a clear-statement rule.
Unless a company can point to explicit language in the relevant
agreement stating that "retiree benefits" terminate at a particular date
or do not vest, the benefits seem to vest as a matter of law. What we
continually disclaim presuming we continually seem to presume. -
Judge Jeffrey Sutton
What a drag it is getting old. - Mick Jagger 2
INTRODUCTION
While retirement seems like the time to relax and unwind after years of
slaving over your job, coasting off to the vacation spot with your nest egg
and gold watch is becoming less of a given and more of a luxury. Playing
that lazy round of golf might have to wait, as today, many workers feel the
financial need to either remain at a job several years longer than they ever
expected, or seek entirely different work in retirement, thus postponing the
relaxation that retirement was supposed to offer. One of the reasons for
this sad reality is the increasing lack of health care provided to employees
by their employers. A study by the Department of Labor found that only
34% of retirees over age 55 were covered by employer-sponsored health
care plans in 1994, a decrease of 10% from 1988.3 Other reports indicate
* J.D., St. John's University School of Law, 2010; B.A., Villanova University, 2001.
1 Noe v. PolyOne Corp., 520 F.3d 548, 565-67 (6th Cir. 2008) (Sutton, J., dissenting) (describing a
presumption that the Sixth Circuit seems to employ towards the vesting of retirement benefits at the
expiration of collective bargaining agreement, despite its claims that it does not apply such a
presumption).
2 Mick Jagger & Keith Richards, Mother's Little Helper, AFTERMATH (Decca Records, 1966).
3 See MARK A. ROTHSTEIN & LANCE LIEBMAN, EMPLOYMENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 1239
(6th ed. 2007) (citing U.S. Dep't of Labor, Retirement Benefits of American Workers, 27, 29 (2006)).
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that this number has decreased yet again since the early 1990s. 4 Much of
this decrease in providing of retirement health coverage is due to the
precarious financial status of our nation. The United States has been mired
in its worst economic crisis of the past 60 years, 5 and employers are trying
to make financial decisions that will increase profits, even at the expense of
those who have worked to build the company to its current status.
The nation as a whole is getting older, as "baby boomers" 6 are aging and
moving towards retirement.7 As those individuals eventually retire,
employers likely face a tremendous burden of paying retirement and health
benefits to all of them. According to the Census Bureau, between the years
2005 and 2025, the number of people 55 to 64 will increase by 36.4%, and
those aged 65 and older will increase by 73.1%, while those between the
ages of 25 and 54 will increase by only 3.8%.8 Those aged 65 and older
will make up nearly 19% of the population, and many of them will be
retired, or heading towards retirement. 9 Along with the increase in
retirement-aged individuals, the life expectancy of Americans has steadily
increased and now stands at more than 78 years. o This increase means that
Americans are spending more time living in those retirement years, and
thus costing more for employers who pay for health benefits.
As a result, many employers are keeping older employees in lesser
capacities in an attempt to avoid losing tremendous numbers of workers to
retirementlI and to avoid paying retirement benefits to all of those workers
4 See William Payne & Pamina Ewing, Union-Negotiated Lifetime Retiree Health Benefits:
Promise or Illusion, 9 MARQEA 319, 319 (2008) (discussing the increase in the number of employers
reducing or terminating benefits).
5 See Laura Meckler & Jonathan Weisman, Obama to Callfor a New Era of Responsibility, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 20, 2009, at Al (noting that the United States is suffering its "worst economic crisis since
the Great Depression"); World Bank: Economy Worst Since Depression, CNNMONEY.COM, Mar. 9,
2009, http://money.cnn.com/2009/03/09/news/intemational/global-economyworld bank/ (highlighting
the fact that the global economy, in addition to the U.S. economy, is experiencing its "worst
performance since the Great Depression").
6 See PATRICK PURCELL, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., OLDER WORKERS: EMPLOYMENT
AND RETIREMENT TRENDS 2 (2006), available at http://aging.senate.gov/crs/pension34.pdf (defining
"baby boomers" as those individuals born between 1946 and 1964).
7 Id (noting that the demographics of the United States will change when the "baby boomers"
reach retirement age).
8 Id. at 2 (giving statistics showing the drastic changes in the percentage of older Americans in the
coming years, in comparison to the younger generation).
9 Id (showing evidence of the aging of America's Population).
10 See David Brown, Life Expectancy Hits Record High in United States, WASH. POST, June 12,
2008, at A4 (defining life expectancy as "the calculation of how long a newborn could expect to live if
the mortality rates at birth prevailed for a lifetime"); CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, Life Expectancy
at Birth, in THE WORLD FACTBOOK, available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/fields/print_2102.html (declaring that the life expectancy of the total United States population
is 78.11 years as of 2009).
11 See PURCELL, supra note 6, at 1-2 ("The age-distribution [of] those 25 to 64 years old already is
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once they are gone. 12 So far, some major companies have actually taken
steps to eliminate altogether the distribution of health benefits to retirees.13
This type of action can strike fear into the minds of those who are counting
on those employee benefits once they retire.
I. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS AND THE VESTING OF
RETIREMENT BENEFITS
Amidst the financial struggles of employee and retiree compensation,
one issue that has long split federal circuits, and still does today, is what to
do with retirement benefits at the end of a collective bargaining agreement.
Particularly, courts have diverged over whether retirement benefits become
vested for a lifetime upon the expiration of the collective bargaining
agreement (CBA) when the agreement is silent or ambiguous on how to
handle those benefits. Most of the courts that have looked at the issue have
based their decisions on their agreement or disagreement with the 1983
Sixth Circuit decision International Union, UA Wv. Yard-Man, Inc.14
The courts that follow Yard-Man choose to interpret the collective
bargaining agreement in a contract-style method; examining whether the
intent of the parties, based on language and context of the agreement, was
to have the retirement benefits vest beyond the expiration of the
agreement. 15 Alternately, a majority of courts have held that once the
collective bargaining agreement ends, there should be a presumption
against the vesting of the benefits. 16 This note will address the circuit split,
particularly the most recent cases on the subject, and argue that the
undergoing a substantial shift toward a greater number of older individuals and a relative scarcity of
young people entering the labor force."); U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, OLDER WORKERS:
DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS POSE CHALLENGES FOR EMPLOYERS AND WORKERS, UNITED STATES
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE 19 (2001) (stating that older workers are less likely to lose their jobs
than younger workers).
12 PURCELL supra note 6, at 13 (indicating that many employers are having their older employees
work part-time or part-year schedules, to avoid having them retire); ROBERT HUTCHENS & KERRY L.
PAPPS, DEVELOPMENTS IN PHASED RETIREMENT (2004) (exploring why employers keep employees
working in order to avoid paying all retirements benefits).
13 Nick Bunkley, Some White Collar G.M Retirees Scramble as Health Care is Cut Off, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 10, 2008, at BI (describing how General Motors decided to cut the health benefits of
many of its workers, in order to save $1.5 billion at a time when the corporation was struggling);
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, CAN THE RETIREE HEALTH
BENEFITS PROVIDED BY YOUR EMPLOYER BE CUT? 1 (2010), available at http://www.dol.goviebsa/pdf
/retireehealthbenefits.pdf ("[N]othing in federal law prevents them from cutting or eliminating those
benefits - unless they have made a specific promise to maintain the benefits.").
14 716 F.2d 1476 (6th Cir. 1983) (holding that retirees were entitled to continuing benefits despite
the expiration of the collective agreement).
15 See infra Part I, A (discussing the contractual approach to examining the collective bargaining
agreement).
16 See infra Part III, B (discussing the presumption against vesting).
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presumption against vesting is not desirable. The note will also explore a
third method, a presumption towards the vesting of retirement benefits
when a collective bargaining agreement expires. No circuits claim to
directly subscribe to this method, but this note will argue that the Sixth
Circuit, despite its consistent claims to the contrary, actually does apply a
presumption towards the vesting of retirement benefits, and that this is the
correct approach. 17
II. BACKGROUND
The rewarding of retirement benefits can be a highly sensitive matter for
retirees and their former employer. If a unionized group of workers reach a
collective bargaining agreement, that agreement usually remains in effect
for a determined period of time. 18 When that period ends, the agreement
expires and a new accord must be negotiated and agreed upon between the
two parties.19 When a collective bargaining agreement ends, often the
current employees' rights under that agreement expire immediately or
shortly thereafter. 20 A question has arisen in many circuits as to whether
the rights and benefits of the retirees, which were also negotiated under that
agreement, vest for the retirees' lifetime or whether they expire as well.21
There has been much debate over the topic.
According to the National Labor Relations Act,22 a collective bargaining
agreement is an agreement for the performance of the mutual obligation of
the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms
and conditions of employment.23
17 Noe v. PolyOne Corp., 520 F.3d 548, 567 (6th Cir. 2008) (describing a presumption that some
courts seem to unwillingly employ towards the vesting of retirement benefits).
18 Bidlack v. Wheelabrator Corp., 993 F.2d 603, 607 (7th Cir. 1993) (referring to a collective
bargaining agreement as "invariably three years"); Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1478 (noting that the
agreement began in 1974 and was to end in 1977).
19 See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006).
20 Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1480 (noting that employees' benefits could be interpreted to end with
the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement); Wheelabrator, 993 F.2d at 607 (presuming that a
collective bargaining agreement stops when the term is up).
21 Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1480 (noting that benefits of Yard-Man's employees could end when the
collective bargaining agreement expired); Wheelabrator, 993 F.2d at 604 (examining whether collecting
bargaining agreements conferred a lifetime right to health benefits in the seventh circuit).2 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169.
23 See id .at § 158(d) (defining the act of bargaining collectively as a mutual obligation between
employer and the representative of the employees); see also Charles J. Morris, A Blueprint for Reform
of the National Labor Relations Act, 8 Admin. L.J. Am. U. 523-24, n.19 (quoting the National Labor
Relations Act and noting that the Act only gives a bare bones procedural description of the collective
bargaining process).
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The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 24 which was
passed in 1974 is a federal law geared towards protecting retirees by setting
"minimum standards for most voluntarily established pension and health
plans in private industry to provide protection for individuals in these
plans." 25 Aside from retirement benefits provided by an employer, there are
other types of support for workers who are retired or unemployed, such as
Social Security and COBRA,26 however, those programs will not be the
focus of this note.
III. METHODS FOR RESOLVING RETIREMENT BENEFITS AT THE EXPIRATION
OF A CBA
A. The Yard-Man Inference and the Contractual Approach
The landmark case, International Union, UAW v. Yard-Man, Inc.,27 is a
Sixth Circuit decision that affirmed the district court holding that an
employer, Yard-Man, breached its collective bargaining agreement when it
terminated the health and life insurance benefits of its unionized retirees. 28
The circuit court held that those benefits of the retirees had vested upon the
expiration of their agreement. 29 As the contract in the CBA did not
specifically spell out what should be done with the retirement benefits at
the end of the agreement, the court used a contractual interpretation
approach to reach its conclusion. 30 The approach that the Yard-Man court
used to determine whether the benefits should vest has made Yard-Man a
starting point for many courts when making judgments in the same
24 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2006).
25 U.S. Dep't of Labor, Retirement Plans, Benefits and Savings: Employment Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA), www.dol.gov/dol/topic/retirement/erisa.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2011).
26 See David L. Gregory, COBRA: Congress Provides Partial Protection Against Employer
Termination of Retiree Health Insurance, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 77, 83-84 (1987) (describing the
history and significance of the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA) plan for
former workers); see also Brian J. Harrigan, Erosion of Retiree Health Benefits: Impact on Health
Status ofNear-Elderly, 8 GEO. PUBLIC POL'Y REV. 85, 88-90 (2003) (noting the presence of COBRA as
an option for aging retirees).
27 716 F.2d 1476 (6th Cir. 1983).
28 See id. at 1478 (holding that Yard-Man breached its collective bargaining agreement with its
employees by terminating the benefits of retired employees at the agreement's expiration).
29 See id. (stating that Yard-Man and the Union intended to create vesting benefits to retirees that
would outlive the duration of the bargaining agreement); see also Weimer v. Kurz-Kasch, Inc., 773
F.2d 669, 672 (6th Cir. 1985) (explaining that the fact that retiree benefits are vested, as a response to
the lack of protection retirees have in the collective bargaining process, is a factor that supports the
interpretation that retiree benefits do survive the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement).
30 See Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1480 (noting that because the agreement was ambiguous the Court
was required to look to other provisions of the agreement for evidence of intent); see also Gregory,
supra note 26, at 88-89 (discussing the principles of contractual interpretation used in Yard-Man).
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situation; some have referenced the opinion positively, while others have
decried the methods used in that case, instead choosing to take an alternate
approach. 31
In Yard-Man, a 1974 collective bargaining agreement was reached
between the United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement
Workers (UAW) and the employer, Yard-Man. The agreement covered
employees at a plant in Jackson, Michigan. 32 It was set to expire in 1977,
but the Jackson plant closed in 1975.33 Yard-Man informed the retirees
from the plant that once the collective bargaining agreement expired, health
and life insurance benefits of the active employees and the retirees would
terminate. 34 The retirees eventually filed a lawsuit seeking specific
performance of Yard-Man to pay the health and life insurance benefits
beyond the CBA. The District Court found that Yard-Man breached its
contractual obligations in canceling the insurance and benefit plans of the
Jackson retirees upon the collective bargaining agreement's expiration.35
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the District Court
decision that Yard-Man violated the agreement by stopping payment of
retiree health benefits.36 The court stated that the intent of the parties
should be considered in deciding whether retiree insurance benefits vest
and continue once the CBA expires.37 Yard-Man also held that in
determining whether the parties' intent was to vest, courts should look at
the explicit language of the collective bargaining agreement and the context
which gave rise to its inclusion. 38 Also, those provisions should be
construed with the entire document and the parties' purposes in mind.39
The court stated that the terms of an agreement must be interpreted in a
way that renders none of them "nugatory" and in a way that avoids
"illusory promises." 40 The court importantly noted that the contractual
interpretation is applied, as long as that interpretation is consistent with
31 See infra Part III, B (identifying the various Circuits that do not subscribe to the Yard-Man
approach).
32 Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1478.
33 Id.
34 Id
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 1479 ("The District Court properly recognized that whether retiree insurance benefits
continue beyond the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement depends upon the intent of the
parties.").
38 Id.
39 See id. (declaring "[t]he court should also interpret each provision in question as part of the
integrated whole. If possible, each provision should be construed consistently with the entire document
and the relative positions and purposes of the parties.").
40 See id. at 1480 (emphasizing the damaging nature of illusory or inconsistent promises).
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federal labor policies.41
In Yard-Man, the relevant sections of the parties' collective bargaining
agreement provided that for former employees aged 65 or older, "the
company will provide insurance benefits equal to the active group
benefit .. . for the former employee and his spouse." 42 The court noted that
if an agreement is ambiguous or silent regarding how to interpret the intent
of the parties, then the court must look to other portions of the agreement as
determining factors. 43 In Yard-Man, the court stated that the language of
the contract in question was indeed ambiguous.44 It was determined that the
wording could be construed to simply say that the retirees get the same
benefits that the employees receive.45 However, it could also be construed
to state that retirees get the same benefits as the employees for the same
duration as those employees.46 Due to this ambiguity, other portions of the
agreement were to be examined.47
Part of the Yard-Man decision which has been very controversial, and
has been responsible for much of the circuit split, is the wording of the
opinion that states that,
retiree benefits are in a sense 'status' benefits which, as such
carry with them an inference that they continue so long as the
prerequisite status is maintained. Thus when the parties contract
for benefits which accrue upon achievement of retiree status,
there is an inference that the parties likely intended those benefits
to continue as long as the beneficiary remains a retiree. 48
One reason the Yard-Man court gave for finding that the retirement
41 See id (stating "the court should review the interpretation ultimately derived from its
examination of the language, context and other indicia of intent for consistency with federal labor
policy.").
42 Id
43 See id. (noting that "where ambiguities exist, the court may look to other words and phrases in
the collective bargaining agreement for guidance").
44 Id. (agreeing with the district court).
45 Id. If interpreted this way, the benefits, while they existed, were to be the same for the retirees
as for the active employees. Id.
46 See id. The wording could "reasonably be construed.. .as... an incorporation of some durational
limitation...." If interpreted this way, the benefits would be the same for retirees and active employees,
and would last only as long as those of the active employees. Id.
47 See id. (stating that looking to other provisions of the collective bargaining agreement would be
for the purposes of obtaining evidence of intent and an interpretation which would be harmonious with
the entire agreement); see also Refinery Employees' Union v. U.S. Dist. Court, W. Dist. of La., 160 F.
Supp. 723, 731 (W.D. La. 1958) (noting that "where there is doubt as to the meaning of certain words,
they may be explained by referring to others words and phrases used [in the contract]"); cf Yolton v. El
Paso Tenn. Pipeline Co., 435 F.3d 571, 591 (6th Cir. 2006) (making clear that extrinsic evidence may
not be used if the terms of a contract are unambiguous).
48 Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1482.
8092011]
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benefits should exist beyond the termination of the collective bargaining
agreement was the presence of specific durational limitations in other parts
of the agreement. 49 Within the agreement, several other portions were
subject to specific limitations on duration, while no such specific durational
limitation was present for the distribution of retiree benefits.50 The court
saw this as evidence that the parties intended to maintain the retiree
benefits beyond the expiration of the agreement.5' The Court also held that
a finding of intent to create everlasting rights to insurance benefits for
retirees, minus explicit language in the agreement, is not inconsistent with
federal labor law. 52
In determining that the benefits of the retired workers vested, the court
noted that it seemed impractical to base the existence of benefits for
retirees on the possibility that active workers might or might not be laid
off.53 In emphasizing this point, the court referenced the Supreme Court
case, Allied Chemical Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.54 In
Pittsburgh Plate Glass, the Supreme Court determined that when an
individual is already retired, his retirement benefits are a permissive, not
mandatory, subject of bargaining. 55 Because of that fact, the court in Yard-
Man noted that it is not likely that "such benefits, which are typically
understood as a form of delayed compensation or reward for past services,
would be left to the contingencies of future negotiations." 56
49 Id at 1481-82. For example, Article XIX of the agreement provided that savings and pension
plan programs would only continue until the end of the collective bargaining agreement. Id.
50 See id. at 1481-82. For example, the agreement stated that savings and pension plan programs
would only continue until the end of the collective bargaining agreement, at which point they would
expire. Nothing of this nature existed for the health and insurance benefits. Id. at 1482. In determining
whether other evidence points to a vesting of retirement benefits in this case, the court also determined
that limiting health insurance for a retiree's family upon the retiree's death only to the expiration of the
CBA is an exception to the anticipated continuation of retiree benefits beyond the life of the CBA. Id. at
1481.
51 See id at 1481-82 (discussing the Sixth Circuit's holding in Yard-Man); see also Mioni v.
Bessemer Cement Company, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19219, 12-14 (holding that a finding of intent to
create everlasting rights to insurance benefits is not inconsistent with federal law).
52 See Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1482 (discussing the Sixth Circuit's holding in Yard-Man); see also
Mioni v. Bessemer Cement Company, Civ. Action No. 82-2377, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19219, at 12-
14 (W.D. Penn. 1986) (explaining federal laws).
53 See Yard-Man, 715 F.2d at 1481 (noting how the tenuous nature of employee status seems too
unreliable for the retirees to base the existence of their benefits); see also Gregory P. Rogers, Re-
thinking Yard-Man: A Return to Fundamental Contract Principles, 37 EMORY L.J. 1033, 1041-49
(1988) (explaining the difficulty of determining whether retiree's benefits vested).
54 404 U.S. 157 (1971) (holding that the term "employee" excludes "retirees").
55 See id. at 181-82 (discussing the nature of insurance benefits after retirement); see also Yard-
Man, 716 F.2d at 1482 (exploring the nature of insurance benefits after retirement).
56 See Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1482. "If [employees] forego wages now in expectation of retiree
benefits, they would want assurance that once they retire they will continue to receive such benefits
regardless of the bargain reached in subsequent agreements." Id.
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After Yard-Man, numerous cases followed and held in favor of the
retirees in similar situations, based on the Yard-Man inference. 57 Amongst
them was a Sixth Circuit decision Weimer v. Kurz-Kasch, Inc,58 in which
the court held that the benefits denied to retirees at the expiration of their
collective bargaining agreement should have been considered vested based
on the intent of the parties. 59
While some over the years have read the Yard-Man inference to provide
a presumption in favor of vesting for retirees, many recent cases have
argued that the Yard-Man inference is not a presumption, and should
simply be used as a determination of whether parties showed intent to
vest.60 In Golden v. Kelsey-Hayes Co.,61 the court noted that the inference
is designed to "simply guide courts faced with the task of discerning the
intent of the parties from vague or ambiguous CBAs."62 In a 2006 case,
Yolton v. El Paso Tenn. Pipeline Co.,63 the Sixth Circuit court addressed
how it believed that the Yard-Man inference should be construed.64 The
court noted in Yolton that the parties (as well as some of the previous
opinions of the Sixth Circuit) seemed to be misinterpreting the term
"inference" used in Yard-Man to mean a legal presumption towards the
vesting of the benefits of the retirees. 65 Circuit Judge Boyce F. Martin Jr.
spoke of how numerous employers had been dismayed over the
presumption of vesting they assumed was provided in Yard-Man.66 Martin
57 See United Auto Workers v. Cadillac Malleable Iron Co., 728 F.2d 807, 809 (6th Cir. 1984)
(affirming the Sixth Circuit's Yard-Man method); see also Gregory, supra note 26, at 91 ("Thus,
although the court of appeals rejected any lifetime presumption, its heavy and express reliance on Yard-
Man strongly indicated a judicial disposition to construe retiree benefits grounded in collective
bargaining agreements in a fashion most beneficial to the retirees.").
58 773 F.2d 669 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding that benefits denied to retirees after the expiration of their
collective bargaining agreement should have vested due to the intent of the parties).
59 See Weimer, 773 F.2d at 676 (discussing that benefits should vest based on the intent of the
parties); see also Nathanael Berneking, Don't Mow Over the Yard-Man Inference: Guarding Against
Improper Modification of Welfare Benefits Provided in a Collective Bargaining Agreement 45 ST.
Louis L.J. 261, 273 (2001) ("Thus the court continued Yard-Man's trend of considering the existence
of retiree benefits in light of other factors.").
60 See Payne & Ewing, supra note 4, at 331 (demonstrating that Yard-Man is not a presumption of
vested benefits); Golden v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 73 F.3d 648, 656 (6th Cir. 1995) (explaining that Yard-
Man did not establish a presumption that benefits vest).
61 73 F.3d at 656 (noting that Yard-Man is misinterpreted as a presumption of vested benefits).
62 Id. (stating that Yard-Man did not shift the burden of proof to the employer).
63 435 F.3d 571 (6th Cir. 2006).
64 Id. at 580. ("Rather, the inference functions more to provide a contextual understanding about
the nature of labor-management negotiations over retirement benefits.").
65 Id. (quoting Maurer v. Joy Technologies Inc., 212 F.3d 907, 917 (6th Cir. 2000)).
66 Id. at 579-80 (explaining how the Yard-Man decision has led to controversy); see also United
Auto Workers v. Cadillac Malleable Iron Co., 728 F.2d 807 (6th Cir. 1984) (clarifying the proper
interpretation of an inference that the parties intended the retirement benefits to continue as long as one
remains a retiree).
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said that "[t]his Court has never inferred an intent to vest benefits in the
absence of either explicit contractual language or extrinsic evidence
indicating such an intent."67 Yolton explained that Yard-Man's instruction
is for the courts to "apply ordinary principles of contract interpretation." 68
Finally, the Yolton court pointed to federal retirement law ERISA69
which provides that there are two types of employee benefits. 70 One type,
pension plans, is subject to mandatory participation and vesting according
to ERISA's rules. 71 The other type, welfare benefits, is not subject to the
same mandatory participation and vesting requirements. 72 Under ERISA,
health insurance benefits for retirees fall into the category of welfare
benefits. 73 As such, Yolton held that retiree health insurance benefits were
not mandatorily vested under ERISA.74 As previously seen in Pittsburgh
Glass though, something that is not a mandatory subject of bargaining can
still be permissively bargained for.75
Even within the circuits that support the Yard-Man inference, the validity
of the law has been challenged many times, but those courts continue to
uphold its validity, spurning those efforts to reverse Yard-Man.76 For
example, the Sixth Circuit has seen several cases that presented such
challenges in situations where the Yard-Man inference was then determined
to be inapplicable. Some argued that Sprague v. General Motors,77
67 See Yolton, 435 F.3d at 580.
68 Id.
69 ERISA is the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2006);
U.S. Dep't of Labor, supra note 25 (explaining that ERISA "is a federal law that sets minimum
standards for most voluntarily established pension and health plans in private industry to provide
protection for individual in these plans").
70 Noe v. PolyOne Corp., 520 F.3d at 552 (6th Cir. 2008); Yolton, 435 F.3d at 578.
71 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1), (2)(a); Yolton, 435 F.3d at 578, n.4.
72 See 29 U.S.C. § 1051 (stating that employment welfare benefit plans are exempt from vesting
requirements); Yolton, 435 F.3d at 578 n.4 (noting that welfare benefits are not subject to vesting
requirements).
73 See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (including insurance benefit plans in the definition of welfare benefit
plan); Yolton, 435 F.3d at 578 n.4 (indicating that insurance plans are classified as welfare benefit plans
under ERISA).
74 See Yolton, 435 F.3d at 578 n.4 (remarking that while pension plans are subject to mandatory
participation, vesting, and funding requirements, welfare benefits are not subject to the same
requirements); Golden v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 73 F.3d 648, 654, n.7 (6th Cir. 1996) (maintaining that
there is no right to lifetime health insurance benefits under ERISA).
75 See supra notes 54-56, and accompanying text.
76 See Maurer v. Joy Techs., Inc., 212 F.3d 907 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that the benefits of retirees
vested upon expiration of their collective bargaining agreement); Int'l Union, United Auto., Aerospace
& Agric. Implement Workers of Am. v. BVR Liquidating, Inc., 190 F.3d 768, 772 (6th Cir. 1999)
(rejecting the defendant's argument against applying the Yard-Man inference within the case, and
noting that the inference is still useful).
77 133 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 1998).
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appeared to overrule the Yard-Man decision.78 In Sprague, employees
complained of being denied lifetime retiree health care benefits. 79 The
employer's benefits booklets did mention lifetime coverage for retirees,
however the plan also gave General Motors the right to reserve the right to
amend or terminate the plan.80 The court held that the unambiguous right of
the employer to amend the plan made it clear that the retiree benefits did
not vest.81 However, Sprague featured a distinct factor that distinguished
that case from the law established in Yard-Man.82 Yard-Man and the cases
that have followed it dealt with two-party contracts, while Sprague dealt
with a plan unilaterally implemented and thus controlled by General
Motors.83
In 2009, the vesting of retiree benefits became an issue again in the Sixth
Circuit in Winnett v. Caterpillar, Inc.84 In Winnett, a collective bargaining
agreement was reached in 1988 between the union and the employer,
Caterpillar.85 The agreement expired in 1991, and a new collective
bargaining agreement was not reached until 1998.86 Caterpillar unilaterally
implemented caps on the amount it would pay for retiree health coverage
for employees who retired after January 1, 1992.87 Between 1992 and
1998, several employees retired and brought claims that their no-cost
retiree medical benefits were vested based on the 1988 agreement, and that
78 See id. at 404 (refusing to consider evidence that GM had stated that retirement health benefits
would have lifetime tenure because written documents contained language stating otherwise, and GM
had never said that benefits were vested or fully paid-up); Yolton, 435 F.3d at 580, n.5 (rejecting
defendant's argument that Sprague overruled Yard-Man).
79 See Sprague, 133 F.3d at 392 (highlighting plaintiff's claim).
80 See id. at 393-94 (discussing excerpts from benefit booklets); see also Alicia Mazurek, Class
Certifications to Modify Retiree Healthcare Benefits Met the Requirements of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23 of Fair, Reasonable and Adequate, 86 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 39, 41-42 (highlighting
the facts of Sprague).
81 See Sprague, 133 F.3d at 404 (concluding that plaintiff's estoppel claims failed because GM
unambiguously reserved the right to amend or terminate the health plan); see also Mazurek, supra note
80, at 41-42 (noting that the retiree benefits had not vested because GM has unambiguously reserved
the right to modify the health plan).
82 See Int'l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am. v. BVR
Liquidating, Inc., 190 F.3d 768, 773 (6th Cir. 1999) (clarifying that the holding in Sprague only applied
to situations where the employer imposed a unilateral agreement on its employees, which would allow
it to amend or terminate the benefits); see generally Sprague, 133 F.3d at 399 (holding that the retirees
made an enforceable unilateral contract with General Motors).
83 See Maurer v. Joy Techs., 212 F.3d 907, 919 (6th Cir. 2000) (distinguishing Sprague from cases
involving two-party contracts); see generally Sprague, 133 F.3d at 410 (noting that in 1985 General
Motors became self insured).
84 553 F.3d 1000 (6th Cir. 2009).
85 See id. at 1003 (referring to the 1988 bargaining agreement).
86 See id. (discussing the 1998 comprehensive successor collective labor agreement).
87 See id. ("On November 20, following more unsuccessful negotiations, Caterpillar advised the
UAW that, effective December 1, it would unilaterally and retroactively implement caps on the amount
Caterpillar would pay for retiree health coverage for employees who retired after January 1, 1992.").
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the caps added unilaterally in 1992 should not apply to them.88 The court
noted that the retirees bringing the suit were still active employees when
the 1988 agreement expired. 89 Based on the intent of the parties, the court
determined that under the 1988 agreement, retirement benefits vested when
a worker was retired, not when a worker became eligible for retirement. 90
Like the Sprague case, the court held that the Yard-Man inference did not
apply in Winnett because Winnett dealt with employees who were still
active, as opposed to actual retirees. 91 Though distinguishing Yard-Man
specifically for purposes of that case, the court again failed to overturn the
long-running holding of the circuit.92 Yard-Man remains good law. 93
Although reading Yard-Man to say that the inference is not a
presumption of vesting retiree benefitS94 creates a more arduous process for
retirees to argue for the vesting of their benefits, courts have found this
goal attainable for retirees. In 2008, Noe v. PolyOne Corp.,95 another Sixth
Circuit decision, revisited the topic of whether the parties in a collective
bargaining agreement intended for the benefits of retirees to vest upon
expiration of the agreement. 96 In basic terms, the plaintiffs were retirees
who felt that the Employee Benefits Agreements (EBAs) that provided
them with no obligation to pay for health insurance premiums,
reimbursement for Medicare and $1 prescriptions, were vested and would
last for life. 97 Soon, the employer, PolyOne, implemented a Flexible
Benefit Program, also known as a flex program, which altered the benefits
of employees and soon required the retirees to pay higher prescription
prices, contribute to insurance premiums and pay for Medicare. 98 The court
88 See id. at 1008 (arguing that any changes to plaintiffs' medical benefits could not be changed
absent their consent).
89 Id.
90 See id. at 1012 (reversing the lower court decision).
91 See id. at 1011 (rejecting the Yard-Man rule under the circumstances in Winnett).
92 See id. (noting that the Yard-Man inference did not apply, but not overruling Yard-Man); Nat'l
Chamber Litigation Center, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Winnett, et al. v. Caterpillar Inc.: Lifetime
Retiree Benefits Under Collective Bargaining Agreement, http://www.chamberlitigation.com/winnett-
et-al-v-caterpillar-inc (last visited Feb. 20, 2011) (noting that the court in Winnett "clarified" the Yard-
Man inference).
93 See Yolton v. El Paso Tenn. Pipeline Co., 435 F.3d 571, 580 (6th Cir. 2006) (finding "no need
to revise, reconsider, or overrule Yard-Man."); see also Int'l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric.
Implement Workers of Am. v. BVR Liquidating, Inc., 190 F.3d 768, 773 (6th Cir. 1999) (finding the
Yard-Man inference applicable on the given facts).
94 See infra Part III, B.
95 520 F.3d 548 (6th Cir. 2008).
96 Id. at 550-51.
97 Id. at 551 (noting that the plaintiffs' union, Distillery, Rectifying, Wine and Allied Workers'
International Union of America, negotiated the terms collectively for the employees).
98 Id. (instituting the new Flexible Benefit Program in 1988 to replace the EBAs).
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determined that the retiree benefits were intended to vest, and thus vacated
the district court's award of summary judgment in favor of the defendant
employer.99
The court's decision included several important reasons for determining
that the parties intended the retirees' benefits to vest.100 First, the court
looked at the language which gave no indication that the parties did not
intend for the benefits to vest.101 Second, the court noted that the durational
provisions were of a general nature, and thus do not bar a finding that there
was an intent to vest. 102 If a durational provision is general, then that
provision should be perceived to apply a durational length to the overall
agreement, and not specific parts of the agreement.10 3 The Noe court recalls
that "[a]bsent specific durational language referring to retiree benefits
themselves, courts have held that the general durational language says
nothing about those retiree benefits."l 04 Thus, a provision that deals with
the agreement, but fails to mention the specific retirement benefits
discussed, is considered only a general durational provision and does not
have any impact on the duration of the retirement benefits. 05 Plus, if
specific durational language is mentioned, regarding other specific parts of
the agreement but not referencing retiree benefits, there is further evidence
that there might be an intent to vest.106 If there was intent to preclude
vesting of benefits, the benefits section might include durational language
similar to the limiting durational language of those other sections. 107
99 See id at 564 (declaring that the district court erred in finding that the health benefits did not
vest).
100 See id. at 553 (summarizing the "numerous reasons" upon which the court based its decision).
101 Id. (referring to the EBA health benefit provisions).
102 See id. ("Second, the durational provisions relied on by Polyone and the district court are
general in nature and do not preclude a finding that the parties intended Plaintiffs' benefits to vest.").
103 See Yolton v. El Paso Tenn. Pipeline Co., 435 F.3d 571, 581 (6th Cir. 2006) ("Absent specific
durational language referring to retiree benefits themselves, courts have held that the general durational
language says nothing about those retiree benefits."); see also Schalk v. Teledyne, 751 F. Supp. 1261,
1265 (W.D. Mich. 1990) ("The court stated that the existence of a general durational clause which
provide[s] that the collective bargaining agreement should remain in effect until a certain date d[oes]
not demonstrate an intent that all benefits described in the agreement also terminate on that date.").
104 See Noe, 520 F.3d at 554 (citing Yolton, 435 F.3d at 581).
105 See id(noting that the MOA speaks generically of all benefits for all employees and does not
speak specifically to retirement benefits); see also Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1482 (holding that the clause
of the agreement fails to specifically refer to duration of benefits).
106 See Noe, 520 F.3d at 553 ("The district court held that the retiree health benefits provisions in
the EBAs clearly and unambiguously established that the parties did not intend for the Plaintiffs' health
benefits to vest."); see also Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1481-82 ("[T]he inclusion of specific durational
limitations in other provisions of the current collective bargaining agreements suggests that retiree
benefits, not so specifically limited, were intended to survive the expiration of successive agreements in
the parties' completed long term relationship.").
107 Based on the court's understanding in Noe, it seems clear that if there was a specific intent to
have the benefits vest, the durational language would have accompanied that provision.
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A third thing that the Noe court held was that the agreement expressly
tied the eligibility of retiree health benefits to that of pension eligibility. 08
Since pensions are determined to be mandatorily vested,109 it should be
presumed that if retirement health benefits are linked to the pensions, then
the retirement benefits would also be treated in the same fashion.1 0 Fourth,
the court said that the method argued by the defendant (a presumption
against the vesting of retirement benefits), would make some of the
agreement's promises illusory."'1
Few other courts have supported Yard-Man as strongly as the Sixth
Circuit. The Fourth, Eleventh and First Circuits have all accepted Yard-
Man, but some observers claim that they are fully aligned with the Sixth
Circuit decision,11 2 while others claim that those circuits accept Yard-Man
only in bolstering fashion for other findings, not as the main thrust of its
decisions. 113
B. Presumption Against Vesting
Most circuit courts have held that at the expiration of a collective
bargaining agreement which is silent on the issue of the vesting of
retirement benefits, there should be a presumption against the vesting of
retirement benefits for life. 114 Those circuits do not subscribe to the Yard-
Man inference. In Bidlack v. Wheelabrator Corp., 115 Seventh Circuit
Judge Richard Posner implemented such a presumption against the vesting
of benefits, but only in those situations where the collective bargaining
108 See Noe, 520 F.3d at 553 (explaining that a tie between the eligibility of benefits and pensions
is something the court has "repeatedly held evinces an intent to vest").
109 See supra notes 69-75 and accompanying text.
110 See Noe, 520 F.3d at 553 ("Third, provisions in the EBAs expressly tie eligibility for retiree
health benefits to eligibility for a pension, which we have repeatedly held evinces an intent to vest.").
111 See id. (admitting that illusory promises in an agreement can "result in violation of our
precedent"); see also Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1481-82 (stating that "the inclusion of specific durational
limitations in other provisions of the current collective bargaining agreements suggest that retiree
benefits ... were intended to survive the expiration of successive agreements").
112 See Payne & Ewing, supra note 4, at 332-33 (arguing that Eleventh and Fourth circuits have
fully embraced the Yard-Man decision of the Sixth Circuit through cases such as United Steelworkers
of Am. v. Connors Steel Co., 855 F.2d 1499, 1501 (11 th Cir. 1988) and Keffer v. H. K. Porter Co., Inc.,
872 F.2d 60, 64 (4th Cir. 1989)).
113 See Douglas Sondgeroth, High Hopes: Why Courts Should Fulfill Expectations of Lifetime
Retiree Health Benefits in Ambiguous Collective Bargaining Agreements, 42 B.C. L. REV 1215, 1237-
38 (2001) (arguing that the Eleventh and Fourth Circuits have found other reasons for retirement
benefits to vest, and use Yard-Man to "buttress" those findings); see also Keffer, 872 F.2d at 64
(discussing the factors relevant to the court's decision).
114 See infra notes 117-35, and accompanying text.
115 993 F.2d 603 (7th Cir. 1993).
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agreement was silent on the vesting of retirement benefits.11 6 Posner wrote
that in negotiating a written contract with a definite expiration date, there is
an implication of limited liability for the parties, and looking outside of the
CBA, to presume the vesting of rights, would deprive the participants of
the protections that the contract provides.117
In Rossetto v. Pabst Brewing Co.,"ls the Seventh Circuit again held
firmly in favor of a presumption against lifetime retirement benefits. In
Rossetto, a group of retired machinist workers (and their spouses) received
retirement benefits under a collective bargaining agreement.11 9 Once the
agreement ended and the brewery closed, the plaintiffs argued that their
retirement benefits should continue on rather than expiring.120 In Rossetto,
the Seventh Circuit court broke down a four part rule for how it would
determine whether or not retirement benefits should be vested upon the
expiration of collective bargaining agreements:
1. If a collective bargaining agreement is completely silent on
the duration of health benefits, the entitlement to them expires
with the agreement, as a matter of law (that is, without going
beyond the pleadings), unless the plaintiff can show by
objective evidence that the agreement is latently ambiguous,
that is, that anyone knowledgeable about the real-world
context of the agreement would realize that it might not mean
what it says. This is the Bidlack presumption and its latent-
ambiguity rebuttal.
2. If the agreement makes clear that the entitlement expires
with the agreement, as by including such a phrase as "during
the term of this agreement," then, once again, the plaintiff
loses as a matter of law unless he can show a latent ambiguity
by means of objective evidence. This is a general rule of
contract law, independent of but consistent with Bidlack.
3. If there is language in the agreement to suggest a grant of
lifetime benefits, and the suggestion is not negated by the
116 See id at 608 (noting the likely outcome if the collective bargaining agreements were silent
regarding the duration of benefits); Sondgeroth, supra note 113, at 1240 (commenting on Judge
Posner's presumption).
117 See Bidlack, 993 F.2d at 608 (holding that there should be a presumption against the vesting of
retirement benefits at the end of a collective bargaining agreement, but that this presumption could be
rebutted by the retiree if he can prove that the contract is ambiguous); Sondgeroth, supra note 113, at
1239-40 (noting Judge Posner's desire to protect "the limitation of liabilities" implicit in a fixed term
agreement).
118 217 F.3d 539 (7th Cir. Wis. 2000).
119 See id. at 542.
120 See id.
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agreement read as a whole, the plaintiff is entitled to a trial. Of
course, if the agreement expressly grants such benefits, the
plaintiff is entitled, not to a trial, but to a judgment in his favor.
We are speaking of a case in which merely suggestive
language creates a patent ambiguity.
4. If the plaintiff is entitled to a trial by reason of either a
patent or a latent ambiguity, the normal rules of evidence will
govern the trial, and so the parties will not be limited at trial to
presenting objective evidence of meaning.121
The Rossetto court determined that the language of the collective
bargaining agreement was indeed latently ambiguous, and thus remanded
the case back to the lower court. 122 Per the first part of the four-part test, if
the plaintiffs sought the possibility of having their benefits vest, they had to
rebut the presumption against vesting of benefits at termination of the
collective bargaining agreement.123 They succeeded in rebutting this
presumption. 124 If they had not done so, their rights would have terminated
at that point. 125
The Fifth Circuit is among the other circuits that have held that there is a
presumption that retirement benefits do not vest when a collective
bargaining agreement ends.126 In Nichols v. Alcatel USA, Inc.,127 the court
held that if ambiguity exists in the terms of the contract, only then may the
court look at outside evidence to determine the intent of the parties in the
agreement.128 There was no such ambiguity in this case, according to the
court, and the benefits were deemed unvested. 129 The Nichols court also re-
iterated what the Fifth Circuit had said before - that it does not follow the
Yard-Man inference.130 The Third Circuit has also held against the vesting
of retirement benefits. In Int'l Union v. Skinner Engine Co.,1 31 the circuit
121 See id. at 547.
122 See id. at 545-46.
123 See id.
124 See id
125 See id.
126 Nichols v. Alcatel USA, Inc., 532 F.3d 364, 379 (5th Cir. Tex. 2008).
127 532 F.3d 364 (5th Cir. 2008).
128 See id at 377.
129 See id (holding that the CBAs were not ambiguous and it this case the Union Retirees don't
have any vested rights to benefits).
130 See id. at 378. The court holds that the plaintiffs reliance on the Sixth Circuit's opinion in
Cole v. ArvinMeritor, Inc., 516 F.Supp.2d 850 (E.D. Mich. 2005), was thus misplaced, as the Cole case
"relies on the inference that retiree benefits vest unless there is language in the CBA to the contrary."
Nichols, 532 F.3d at 378.
131 188 F.3d 130 (3d Cir. 1999).
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court rejected Yard-Man, holding that it "cannot agree with Yard-Man and
its progeny that there exists a presumption of lifetime benefits in the
context of employee welfare benefits." 32 The court goes on to argue that
"the Yard-Man inference may be contrary to Congress' intent in choosing
specifically not to provide for the vesting of employee welfare benefits." 33
IV. THIRD METHOD OF ADDRESSING RETIREE BENEFITS UPON THE
EXPIRATION OF A CBA, AND ARGUMENT SUPPORTING THAT METHOD
Although several courts have decided against the Yard-Man inference,
which originated in the Sixth Circuit, and has been followed by a number
of other circuits, 134 a retiree-friendly approach is more appropriate. When a
collective bargaining agreement expires, and the agreement is silent or
ambiguous on the issue of whether retiree benefits vest upon the
agreement's expiration, the proper method for dealing with the legal
struggle is a presumption in favor of vesting retirement benefits.
A. Arguments Supporting Presumption in Favor ofRetirement Vesting
A majority of courts have rejected the Yard-Man inference completely,
and presume that retirement benefits do not vest unless explicit language
orders it; the Sixth Circuit, which nobly favors Yard-Man, has interpreted
that the inference is not a presumption towards the vesting of retiree
benefits. 135 However, a presumption towards the retirees is a valid and
necessary method of handling agreements that are ambiguous on the matter
of vesting retiree benefits. While the Sixth Circuit court has arrived at
appropriate results of vesting in many of the cases it has heard regarding
whether retirement benefits vest at the end of a CBA, the court's reasoning
is faulty. The court fails to correctly interpret the fact that in the way it
reaches those conclusions of vesting of retirement benefits, it is actually
applying a presumption towards vesting of those benefits.136
If language of an agreement specifically states that benefits will not be
vested, then the benefits are intended not to vest. However, when there is
silence or ambiguity in the language on the topic, a legal presumption
132 Id. at 140-41.
133 Id. at 141.
134 See supra notes 114-15, and accompanying text (showing how other courts have dealt with
Yard-Man).
135 See supra Part III, A. (explaining the Yard-Man inference and the contractual approach).
136 See infra notes 140-209, and accompanying text. (arguing the principles of vesting).
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against the vesting of retiree benefits, which other circuits practice, 137 is
advantageous to employers, but potentially degrading to the individual who
has spent his career working for that employer. There are several reasons
why the retiree's benefits should vest, including legal precedent, retirees'
desire to control their own fate, public policy towards the retired workers
and their expectations and reliance on benefits, and avoiding a slippery
slope towards the diminishing of all benefits.
a. Precedent for a Presumption towards Vesting
Some circuit courts have supported the Yard-Man inference, but have
read it only to require an interpretation of the collective bargaining
agreement to determine if it shows the parties' intentions to have retirement
benefits vest upon the expiration of the agreement.138 No courts explicitly
claim to read the Yard-Man inference as a presumption towards vesting of
retirement benefits, but some courts' actions speak differently than their
words. Principally, the Sixth Circuit has consistently affirmed Yard-Man
since its origin, but it claims that there is no presumption towards
vesting.139 This and other courts that have used the Yard-Man approach of
interpreting the parties' intent, have found a smart and thorough way of
viewing the Yard-Man inference - much more humanitarian than a
presumption against vesting. But, when the Sixth Circuit has applied its
style of interpreting the parties' intent in these cases, it actually has
consistently applied a presumption towards vesting, and should continue to
do so.
While opining against the vesting of retiree benefits in the case, 140 Judge
Jeffrey Sutton's dissenting opinion in Noel 41 included a substantial
argument about the way that the Sixth Circuit has actually treated the Yard-
Man inference. 142 As did the majority in Rossetto143 and the concurrence in
137 See supra Part III, B. (showing the courts with hold a presumption against vesting).
138 See Noe v. PolyOne Corp., 520 F.3d 548, 552 (6th Cir. 2008) (clarifying the Sixth Circuit's
interpretation of Yard-Man); see also Maurer v. Joy Techs., Inc., 212 F.3d 907, 914 (6th Cir. 2000)
(noting that the parties' intent determines whether retiree benefits continue following expiration of the
CBA).
139 See supra notes 60-76, and accompanying text (discussing numerous cases in which the Sixth
Circuit consistently ruled that there is no inference).
140 See Noe, 520 F.3d at 564, 551 (holding to apply the Yard-Man inference, which resulted in a
vesting of the retiree plaintiffs' benefits).
141 See id. at 564 (Sutton, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majorities interpretation of the Yard-Man
inference).
142 See id. at 567 (Sutton, J., dissenting) (arguing that having a conclusive presumption is
impractical and will lead to instability in an array of situations that might cause the retiree to only attain
benefits from the company without expecting any depletions).
143 See Rossetto v. Pabst Brewing Co., 217 F.3d 539, 547 (7th Cir. 2000) (describing the methods
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Bidlack,144 Sutton's dissent in Noe describes some defined options for
dealing with the retirement benefits and expiring CBAs, each of which are
addressed at length throughout this note.145 First, courts can create a
presumption against vesting. 146 Sutton opined that this method is
appropriate because it is a significant, and perhaps unusual, decision for a
company to make an unchangeable promise to pay health-care benefits for
life when the agreement is for such an abbreviated time. 147 Another
approach Sutton brings up to deal with the inference is to not adopt any
presumption at all. He feels that this method is beneficial because the
absence of a presumption will lead to proper traditional contract
interpretation and a lack of interference with proper interpretation. 148 The
third option Sutton presents for the court is to adopt a presumption in favor
of the vesting of retiree benefits.149 Among the positives Sutton lists for
this approach is the fact that it aids those retirees who lose their benefits
and are often unable to return to work in an effort to receive benefits.150
Although Sutton does not favor this method, it is the most compassionate
alternative towards those who have put in years of hard labor and laid the
groundwork for the current employees.
Most importantly, in his dissent, Judge Sutton points to the fact that
although in recent cases, the Sixth Circuit has disclaimed that any
presumption towards the vesting of healthcare benefits for retirees exists in
to deal with the vesting benefits issue in different circumstances).
144 Bidlack v. Wheelabrator Corp., 993 F.2d 603, 613 (7th Cir. 1993) (J., Cudahy, concurring)
(discussing an array of methods to interpret the current jurisprudence); see infra notes 197-201 and
accompanying text.
1 See Noe, 520 F.3d at 568 (Sutton, J., dissenting) (proposing three different avenues which
could be applied if there were no existing case law).
146 See id. (Sutton, J., dissenting) (arguing, if left to the courts sole discretion they can apply a
presumption against vesting); Int'l Union, United Auto., Aerospace and Agric. Implement Workers of
Am. v. Skinner Engine Co., 188 F.3d 130, 139 (3d Cir. 1999); Bidlack, 993 F.2d at 606-07 (J., Cudahy,
concurring) (discussing the unchangeable nature of vested rights vs. the brief nature of a CBA).
147 See Noe, 520 F.3d at 568 (Sutton, J., dissenting) (proposing that "a company's unchangeable
promise to pay healthcare benefits for life is a significant and unusual one-particularly when it arises
from a three-year contract").
148 See id. (arguing that "contracts should be interpreted no differently from other collectively
bargained contracts ... applying the traditional principles of labor contract interpretation"); see also,
Senior v. NSTAR Elec. & Gas Corp., 449 F.3d 206, 218 (1st Cir. 2006) (expressing the court's fear
"that the use of presumptions may interfere with the correct interpretation, under normal LMRA [Labor
Management and Relations Act] rules, of the understanding reached by the parties").
149 See Noe, 520 F.3d at 568 (Sutton, J., dissenting) (stating that while no circuit has yet taken this
position, the Sixth Circuit has been applying such a presumption in recent cases); see also, Int'l Union
v. Skinner Engine Co., 188 F.3d 130, 140 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting that pursuant to the Yard-Man
inference, and "its progeny" there exists a presumption that retiree benefits are vested).
150 See Noe, 520 F.3d at 568 (Sutton, J., dissenting) (noting that many of these retirees are not able
to require their union to negotiate new benefits for them either).
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the Yard-Man inference, 151 the Sixth Circuit actually has treated the
inference as a presumption.152 While Sutton's end result, an opinion against
a vesting presumption, is incorrect, his claim that the Sixth Circuit's
behavior has often indicated an unspoken presumption is exactly right.15 3
Sutton notes that due to the decision record of the Sixth Circuit when
dealing with retirement benefits at CBA expiration situations, numerous
observers and courts have recognized the Sixth Circuit's treatment of the
inference as a presumption.154 Sutton makes a tremendous statement about
the definitive nature that the Sixth Circuit seems to have moved towards in
applying the Yard-Man inference:
What started out as a potential inference became an
omnipresent presumption and now appears to have become a
clear-statement rule. Unless a company can point to explicit
language in the relevant agreement stating that "retiree
benefits" terminate at a particular date or do not vest, the
benefits seem to vest as a matter of law. What we continually
disclaim presuming we continually seem to presume.155
Despite the fact that the Sixth Circuit has deliberately elected not to
recognize a presumption, the Circuit consistently applies a presumption to
these cases. 156 This is the approach that should be adopted by other circuits
as well. The crucial element in finding a rebuttable presumption towards
vesting in these cases is the aforementioned issue of durational clauses.157
Based on those Sixth Circuit decisions, the presumption in favor of vesting
151 See id. at 567 (Sutton, J., dissenting). Sutton points to the majority's claim that Yard-Man does
not create a legal presumption of interminable retiree benefits and that Yard-Man creates an inference
"only if the context and other available evidence indicate an intent to vest." See id at 552 (quoting
Yolton v. El Paso Tenn. Pipeline Co., 435 F.3d 571, 579 (6th Cir. 2006)).
152 See id. at 567 (Sutton, J., dissenting). Sutton contends that while the Circuit claims not to
presume, it does so anyway, as their actions and language, such as "healthcare benefits vest as a matter
of law," suggest that "the Yard-Man inference has become a rebuttable presumption." See id. at 568
(Sutton, J., dissenting).
153 See id. at 567 (Sutton, J., dissenting) (highlighting several cases that have referred to the Yard-
Man inference a presumption); see also, Int'l Union v. Skinner Engine Co., 188 F.3d 130, 140 (3d Cir.
1999) (acknowledging that the Sixth Circuit "adopted what has become commonly known as the "Yard-
Man inference," pursuant to which courts presume that the parties intended retiree welfare benefits to
continue for life, notwithstanding the expiration of a collective bargaining agreement," and that the
"Yard-Man inference continues to represent the state of the law in the Sixth Circuit").
154 See Noe, 520 F.3d at 567-68 (Sutton, J., dissenting) (pointing to the language from several
courts including the Seventh, Third, and Second Circuits).
155 See id. at 568 (Sutton, J., dissenting).
156 See id. (noting that "observers, looking at what we have said and done in applying the Yard-
Man inference have called it a presumption); Roger Siske et al., What's New in Employee Benefits,
SHOI I ALI-ABA 59, 322 (2002) (stating "[t]he Sixth Circuit presumes vesting").
157 See Noe, 520 F.3d at 567 (Sutton, J., dissenting) (mentioning how the durational language
affects the presumption).
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of retirement benefits at expiration of a CBA may be rebutted only by
language that specifically goes against the vesting.158 Much of the
substantiation for existence of this presumption comes from the language
the court has used regarding durational limitations. 159 The Sixth Circuit
has claimed that the Yard-Man inference does not shift the burden to the
employer to show that there was no intent to vest,160 but the court stated in
its Yolton opinion that "[a]bsent specific durational language referring to
retiree benefits themselves, courts have held that the general durational
language says nothing about those retiree benefits."'61 This language
clearly indicates that the court will not find an intention to preclude vesting
unless there is durational language that specifically mentions the non-
vesting of retirement benefits. This means that a presumption exists that the
benefits do vest. In several cases, the court has read the Yard-Man language
about durations to mean that the general duration clauses of the agreements
were designed for the agreements as a whole, and not designed to also
create a specific duration for retiree benefits provided in the agreement.162
For example, in its Maurer opinion, the Sixth Circuit court noted that
although the collective bargaining agreement in the case was to terminate
after three years, that termination did not extend to the benefits provided
under the agreement.163 Even the majority in Noe, which combats the
dissent's claim that the Sixth Circuit has applied the Yard-Man inference as
a presumption,164 still shows itself to be cognizant of the overwhelming
158 See id. (suggesting "the Yard-Man inference has become a rebuttable presumption-one that
may be overcome only by a clear-statement reservation of rights"); See Siske, supra n.156, at 322
(mentioning how "[t]he Sixth Circuit ... requires a clear statement of termination to prove otherwise").
159 Yolton v. El Paso Tenn. Pipeline Co., 435 F.3d 571, 581 (6th Cir. 2006) (discussing the
specific language used in Yard-Man); Schalk v. Teledyne, Inc., 751 F.Supp. 1261, 1265 (W.D. Mich.
1990) (discussing Yard-Man's rejection of the durational clause).
160 See Yolton, 435 F.3d at 580 (insisting that the inference does not operate as a presumption, but
rather, requires the support of explicit language or extrinsic evidence of intent); Golden v. Kelsey-
Hayes Co., 73 F.3d 648, 656 (6th Cir. 1996) ("Yard-Man does not shift the burden of proof to the
employer . . . .").
161 Yolton, 435 F. 3d at 581.
162 See Maurer v. Joy Techs., Inc., 212 F.3d 907, 917-18 (6th Cir. 2000) (interpreting Yard-Man to
hold that general durational clauses are not necessarily meant to include retiree benefits); Weimer v.
Kurz-Kasch, Inc., 773 F.3d 669, 676 (6th Cir. 1985) (interpreting Yard-Man to hold that a general
durational clause governing a collective bargaining agreement does not demonstrate intent that all
benefits described in the agreement terminate as of the date set in the clause).
163 Maurer, 212 F.3d at 918 (reaching this conclusion despite the clarity of the durational clause,
as compared to the less clear indications that the retirement benefits were intended to vest).
164 See Noe v. PolyOne Corp., 520 F.3d 548, 563-64 (6th Cir. 2008) (maintaining that the court
merely follows precedent and comes to its determination by applying traditional principles of contract
interpretation); see also Yolton, 435 F. 3d at 579-80 (explaining that unlike a presumption, which would
shift the burden of proof to the employer or require specific anti-vesting language in order to be
rebutted, the Yard-Man inference merely allows the court to infer intent to vest from the context of the
agreement and other evidence).
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tendency the circuit has had towards recognizing the vesting of retirement
benefits upon the expiration of collective bargaining agreements.1 65 The
majority notes that "of the eleven most pertinent Sixth Circuit cases
addressing whether retiree health benefits have vested, this court found
evidence of vesting in ten."1 66 Recognizing this presumption towards
vesting in the Sixth Circuit opinions provides powerful legal precedent in
support of benefits vesting in future cases (at least within that circuit).
Aside from circuit court cases, other courts have also opposed
presumptions against vesting of contractual elements in cases where
explicit terms do not exist. In Litton Fin Printing v. NLRB,167 the United
States Supreme Court held that an arbitration clause continued after the
agreement's termination in order to apply the clause to disputes that arose
under the contract. 168 The Supreme Court noted that rights survive
termination of an agreement if explicit terms say so, but also that vested
benefits can also exist despite a lack of explicit terms. 169
One important thing to note is the sway that Judge Sutton might have on
the landscape of the issue of retirement benefits at the expiration of a CBA.
Judge Sutton has been an influential judge in regards to labor and
employment issues, as he provided a well documented concurring opinion
in Michigan Family Resources Inc. v. SEIU Local 51 7M.170 In that opinion,
Sutton favored the limiting of judicial review of labor arbitration decisions
to arbitrable disputes where the arbitrator exercised bias, a conflict of
interest, or an effort to dispense his own brand of industrial justice.171
Sutton's 2008 dissent in Noe might have some influence on the other
judges who take notice of the presumption in the application of the Yard-
165 See Noe, 520 F.3d at 564, n.5 (recognizing that the vast majority of pertinent Sixth Circuit
cases regarding retiree health benefits have concluded that those benefits were vested); see also, Yolton,
435 F. 3d at 584-85 (concluding that retiree health care benefits were vested based on the agreement
language linking those benefits to pension benefits, the context in which the agreement was made, and
extrinsic evidence); Maurer, 212 F.3d at 917-18 (concluding that the language of the agreements,
although unclear, indirectly indicated that retirement benefits were intended to vest); Weimer, 773 F.3d
at 676 (determining that retiree insurance benefits had vested based on a contract interpretation
approach to the agreement's insurance provision, as well as the lack of specification that those benefits
were meant to expire with the agreement).
166 See Noe, 520 F.3d at 564 n.5.
167 501 U.S. 190 (1991).
168 See id. at 211 (announcing the holding of the Court); see also Bidlack v. Wheelabrator Corp.,
993 F.2d 603, 612 n.2 (7th Cir. 1993) (Cudahy, J., concurring) (discussing the Supreme Court's holding
in Litton).
169 See Litton, 501 U.S. at 207-08 (noting that explicit language can ensure that benefits continue
after agreement expiration); see also Bidlack, 993 F.2d at 612 n.2 (Cudahy, J., concurring)
(commenting on the effect of explicit language under the Supreme Court's Litton opinion).
170 438 F.3d 653 (6b Cir. 2006).
171 Id
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Man inference. As the circuits are split on the issue, one would imagine
that the Supreme Court would eventually weigh in on the topic, particularly
if substantial circuit court judges are drawing attention to the conflict that
still exists.
b. Retirees' Desire to Control Their Own Fate
With the U.S. economy struggling mightily in recent years,172 employers
and active employees both are in positions to look out for themselves.
When a long-time employee negotiates retiree benefits as part of a
collective bargaining agreement, he would likely want to have those
benefits for his entire retirement, not for just three years. But when a young
employee is left to negotiate the rights and benefits of an already retired
worker, there might not be much motivation for him to advance the
interests of those who came before him.173 As Yard-Man explained, retirees
would certainly not want to leave their fate up to the negotiating power of
current and future employees.1 74 Pittsburgh Plate Glass addresses the
matter of leaving the negotiations for retirees' benefits to active workers,
by noting that the active employees do not have tremendous incentive to
negotiate for the benefits of retirees, especially if they know that their
retiree benefits will someday be negotiated by then-active employees.175
The Supreme Court in Pittsburgh Plate Glass stated that "benefits that
active workers may reap by including retired employees under the same
health insurance contract are speculative and insubstantial at best." 76
A smart union representative might try to establish some sort of firm
172 Laura Meckler & Jonathan Weisman, Obama to Call for a New Era of Responsibility, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 20, 2009, at Al (noting that the United States is suffering its "worst economic crisis since
the Great Depression"); see also, World Bank: Economy Worst Since Depression, CNNMONEY.COM,
Mar. 9, 2009, http://money.cnn.com/2009/03/09/news/intemational/global-economyworld-bank/
(discussing the World Banks assessment of the United States economy).
173 Yolton v. El Paso Tenn. Pipeline Co., 435 F.3d 571, 581 (6th Cir. 2006) ("Retirees who have
left their bargaining unit, and can no longer rely on their union to maintain their benefits, are not likely
to leave their benefits alterable based on the changing whims and relative bargaining power of their
former union and employer."); see Golden v. Kelsey-Hayes Company, 845 F. Supp. 410, 413 (E. D.
Mich. 1994) (noting that retirees can rely on their former union to protect their benefits after
retirement).
174 See Int'l Union, UAW v. Yard-Man, Inc., 716 F.2d 1476, 1482 (6th Cir. 1983) (stating that it
would be unusual to subject delayed compensation to the "contingencies of future negotiations");
Cantor v. Berkshire Life Ins. Co., 171 N.E.2d 518, 520-21 (Ohio 1960) (discussing the enforceable
rights of an employee who has met all the plans conditions).
175 See Allied Chemical Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 181-182 (1971)
("By advancing pensioners' interests now, active employees, therefore have no assurance that they will
be the beneficiaries of similar representation when they retire. The insurance against future
contingencies that they may buy in negotiating benefits for retirees is thus a hazardous and therefore,
improbable investment.").
176 See id. at 180.
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retirement (post-employment) benefits while the employees are still active,
because when a worker is still active, the retirement benefits established are
a mandatory subject of bargaining.177 Once the workers are retired, the
rights become permissive (no longer mandatory), and the employer can
alter or eliminate the rights and benefits of the already retired employees,
without being compelled to bargain for that ability.178 A union is permitted
to choose current compensation over future retirement benefits for its
employees, but once the retirement benefits are vested in a person, the
union may no longer bargain those benefits away.179 Thus, a union
representative likely wants clear language of vesting in the agreement, but
if that language is not present, the Yard-Man decision indicates that retirees
would surely want to have the benefits last beyond the end of the
agreement.' 80 As discussed above, ERISA does not require welfare benefits
(including health insurance benefits) to vest as it does for pension
benefits.181 However, despite ERISA not requiring that health insurance
benefits vest, ERISA does not say that the benefits may not vest.182
Therefore, benefits can vest and still meet the requirements of the federal
ERISA law.183
Another reason that the employees would likely want retirement benefits
to continue beyond the expiration of a collective bargaining agreement is
the fact that often a union does not claim to represent the employees once
they are retired.184 If that is the case, then the union is not in the position of
177 See id at 159-60 (discussing mandatory bargaining subjects under NLRA); see N.L.R.B. v.
Scam Instrument Corp., 394 F.2d 884, 887 (7th Cir. 1968) (noting how benefits can become "terms and
conditions of employment").
178 See Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1484 (stating that benefits were a permissive subject of bargaining
so the employer may negotiate over the retiree benefits if the parties so choose); see also Pittsburgh
Plate Glass Company v. Allied Chemical Workers, 177 N.L.R.B. 911, 912 (1969) (explaining that the
obligation to discuss statutorily mandated subjects of collective bargaining ends at retirement).
179 See Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1482 n.8 (clarifying that unions may not negotiate away retirement
benefits that have already vested in specific individuals); Allied Chemical Workers, 404 U.S. at 181
n.20 ("[V]ested retirement rights may not be altered without the pensioner's consent.").
180 See Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1481-83 (arguing that the union and Yard-Man intended benefits to
continue after the CBA terminates); see also Upholsters Int'l Union of N. Am. v. Am. Pad & Textile
Co., 372 F.2d 427, 428 (6th Cir. 1967) (finding that retiree benefits fully vested upon completion of
employment).
181 See supra notes 70-76, and accompanying text.
182 See Maurer v. Joy Techs., Inc., 212 F.3d 907, 917 (6th Cir. 2000) (noting that "parties may
agree to create and vest [welfare benefits]"); Golden v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 73 F.3d 648, 655 (6th Cir.
1996) (highlighting cases beyond Yard-Man that also say employers can "adopt, modify, or terminate
such [ERISA] plans at will").
183 See Maurer, 212 F.3d at 917 (explaining that ERISA does not "mandate minimum vesting
requirements"); Golden 73 F.3d at 655 (stating that "The Court simply noted that ERISA does not
mandate minimum vesting requirements").
184 William Rhoden, After Peace, Can Upshaw Fight for NFL Players Past or Present?, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 2, 2006, at 3D (quoting Gene Upshaw who stated that he does not represent retired
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needing to fight any longer for benefits for those workers who are retired,
thus leaving the retirees out to dry.185 In speaking to the Charlotte
Observer, the late Gene Upshaw, Pro Football Hall of Famer and former
union president for the National Football League Players Association, said
of retired NFL players, "The bottom line is, I don't work for them. They
don't hire me and they can't fire me. They can complain about me all day
long. They can have their opinion. But the active players have the vote.
That's who pays my salary."186
There is also no great incentive for an employer to help retirees or
potential retirees. Health care costs have climbed to very high levels, 187 and
as a result, the typical employer seeks to avoid dealing with the high
rates.188 Employers that do not want to eliminate retirement benefits have
looked to increase retiree contributions or perhaps offer less liberal retiree
health benefits to active employees. 189 As mentioned above, if active
employees know that their benefits are at risk, it might be beneficial for
them to push for smaller benefits for retirees and larger immediate
compensation for themselves. Other active employees might simply be
apathetic about the retirees and not care about what type of coverage
current retirees are getting, or what type of coverage they themselves will
receive when it is time for them to retire. While it might be noble for an
active employee to give up some of his earnings to benefit those who came
before him, it is often a rarity.190
players). See Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers of Am. v. Pittsburgh Plate Gladd Co., 404 U.S. 157,
182 n.20 (1971) (stating that "Since retirees are not members of the bargaining unit, the bargaining
agent is under no statutory duty to represent them in negotiations.").
185 See Rhoden, supra note 184, at 3D; see also Allied Chemical, 404 U.S. at 182 (noting that
retirees are not part of the "bargaining unit").
186 Rhoden, supra note 184, at 3D.
187 See ROTHSTEIN & LIEBMAN, supra note 3, at 1239-40 (noting that the cost of health care is
skyrocketing); see also WILLIAM J. WIATROWSKI, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR STATISTICS, RETIREE HEALTH
CARE BENEFITS: DATA COLLECTION ISSUES 2 (2003), available at http://www.bls.gov/opub/cwc/print
/cm2003071 larOlpl.htm (revealing that health care spending increased from 5.1% of gross domestic
product in 1960 to 13% in 1999).
188 See ROTHSTEIN & LIEBMAN, supra note 3, at 1239 (pointing out that employers are trying to
cut down their retiree health care costs); see also WIATROWSKI, supra note 187, at 3 (explaining that the
rising cost of health care benefits led employers to look for ways to control the costs).
189 See ROTHSTEIN & LIEBMAN, supra note 3, at 1239 (listing ways that employers cut retiree
health care costs, including increasing employee contributions and offering less retiree benefits to
current employees); see also WIATROWSKI, supra note 187, at 3 (positing that employers control health
care costs by offering managed care plans, increasing cost to employees, and limiting coverage for
some services).
190 An example of active employees' apathy toward retirees of their business was recently
reflected in the events occurring within National Football League. Aging retired players of the League
voiced their concerns over the lack of pension and health benefits the union, the National Football
League Players' Association, provided to them. See Ron Kroichick, Pensions in Pro Sports: An Age-
Old Issue for All the Big Leagues, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, Mar. 18, 2007, at Cl. Some of them
are damaged physically or mentally due to the toll the game took on them, and many struggle to make
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c. Public Policy Towards Retired Workers and their
Expectations/Reliance
There is a public policy argument that society wants retirees to be taken
care of and not have to struggle for medical and financial security after a
lifetime of work.191 One concern about the reduction or termination of
benefits at the end of a collective bargaining agreement is the fact that
retired employees are old and often can no longer work for themselves. The
elderly are commonly not in the position to look for new jobs or to fight for
what they feel is a proper award of benefits.192 Nor are employers anxious
to hire the aged. Many workers feel the need to work longer for a long-time
employer to avoid the risk of dealing with the loss of retirement benefits
once their careers are over. 193 Many people do not know how to go about
preparing for retirement, so employer-sponsored health plans are great aids
to those individuals through their older years. One study shows 42% of
those people 55 and over have not given "a lot of thought" to how to
manage their money in retirement so they do not outlive their savings.194
Even more alarming is that due to the expectations workers have in the
health care that is provided for them, 60% of people 55 or older have not
given "a lot of thought" to how to pay for long-term care in a nursing home
or health care costs not covered by Medicare.195
Many employees heavily rely on employer-provided benefits for their
retirement and have expectations that once they retire, the work that they
ends meet. See Mike Lopresti, NFL Players Ignore Birk's Plea, Chance to Aid Their Brethren, USA
TODAY, Feb. 2, 2009, available at www.usatoday.com/sports/columnist/lopresti/2009-02-02-nfl-
gridiron-greats N.htm. Some active players, like Matt Birk of the Baltimore Ravens (then of the
Minnesota Vikings), have made efforts to persuade his NFL colleagues to contribute to the cause of
helping retirees, but has had mixed results. See id. Birk attempted to collect money from fellow active
players, some of whom are multi-millionaires, to aid the retirees, but Birk received only a smattering of
support. See id.
191 See Gregory, supra note 26, at 99 (noting that enactment of COBRA indicates that the United
States is starting to follow other nations in recognizing the "compelling need" to protect retirees' access
to health care); see also WIATROWSKI, supra note 187, at 2 (stating that there is a "need for health care
benefits during retirement").
192 See Harrigan, supra note 26, at 86 (explaining causes of the reduction of benefits and seniors'
difficulties in collecting sufficient income); see also Marsha Mercer, Older Workers: The 'New
Unemployables,' AARP BULLETIN, Nov. 18, 2010, available at http:// www.www.aarp.org/work/job-
hunting/info- 1-2010/older workers the new unemployables.html [hereinafter Older Workers]
(discussing the difficulty seniors have finding new work).
193 See Harrigan, supra note 26 at 85-86 (summarizing the reasons behind eroding retiree health
benefits); see also Older Workers, supra note 192 (discussing seniors that need to continue to search for
work after their original careers).
194 See Ruth Helman and Variny Paladino, Will Americans Ever Become Savers? The 14 'h
Retirement Confidence Survey, 2004, 268 EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INSTITUTE 1, 10 (2004). This
study also finds that 66% of people of all ages have not given "a lot of thought to how to manage their
money in retirement so they do not outlive their savings." Id.
195 See id.
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have done for years will lead to benefits for the duration of their retirement.
Judge Richard Cudahy, in his concurring opinion to Bidlack, noted that
years ago, both employers and employees seemed to be of the belief that
benefits were designed to last a lifetime and that it was economics that led
employers to start reconsidering that position, first in reductions, and
eventually in limitations.196 Cudahy opined that a presumption in favor of
the vesting of retirement benefits is appropriate for a collective bargaining
agreement that contains ambiguity on how to handle those benefits.197
Cudahy said,
Before about 1980, I seriously doubt that it occurred to many
employers to grant retiree health benefits on anything less than
a lifetime basis. The overwhelmingly prevalent trend of labor
contracts was to continue or improve retiree benefits from
contract to contract. It was only in the eighties, with spiraling
medical costs, heightened foreign competition, epidemic
corporate takeovers and the declining bargaining power of
labor, that thought was first given to reducing retiree benefits
from contract to contract or even (though this seems more
implausible) to eliminating such benefits entirely. I think that,
at least before the eighties were in full swing, prevailing
conditions suggested a presumption among unions and
management alike that retiree health benefits vested unless
there was agreement to the contrary.198
Cudahy also wrote that sometimes parties have expectations that are so
fundamental that negotiating about those expectations is unnecessary.199
He notes that in not specifically addressing particular issues, "sometimes
silence says more than words." 200 Retirees will often rely on the benefits
that were provided in their collective bargaining agreement. The
expectation that comes with doing so can leave them desperately in need if
those benefits are negotiated away with no recourse for the retiree that is
being deprived.
196 Bidlack v. Wheelabrator Corp., 993 F.2d 603, 613 (7th Cir. Ind. 1993) (J., Cudahy, concurring)
(noting the changing realities of between the present and when the agreements were made); see also
Paladino, supra note 194, at 7 (discussing the need of employees to change their financial expectations
of retirement).
197 See Bidlack, 993 F.2d at 613 (J., Cudahy, concurring) (arguing that there should be a
presumption of vested benefits unless there is an agreement to the contrary); see also Sondgeroth, supra
note 113, at 1234 (summarizing Judge Cudahy's position).
198 See Bidlack, 993 F.2d at 613 (J., Cudahy, concurring).
199 See id at 612 (Cudahy, J., concurring) (citing ARTHUR CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 570
(Colin K. Kaufman ed., Supp. 1984)).
200 See id
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Finally, a presumption towards vesting provides some legitimacy to
long-term employees who have spent their lives working for a single
company. In Yard-Man, the Sixth Circuit court maintained that a CBA's
terms must be interpreted to avoid illusory promises. 201 Yard-Man offered
to cover retirement insurance when retirees reached 65, but as retirees were
allowed to retire at 55, the retirees would have to pay for the insurance for
those ten years.202 The court noted that if those insurance benefits "were
terminated at the end of the collective bargaining agreement's three-year
term, this promise is completely illusory for many early retirees under age
62."203 This lack of delivering upon the beliefs and expectations of its
workers epitomizes the drawbacks to the denial of vesting in these
situations.
d. Avoiding the Slippery Slope
Another problem with the termination of retirement benefits at the end of
a collective bargaining agreement is the very real risk of a slippery slope.
The denial of vested retirement benefits at the expiration of a CBA can
open the door to more denials and deprivations for retired workers. When a
company knows that its jurisdiction provides for a presumption against
vesting, the presumption can potentially lead to gradual attempts by the
employer to push for increasing leverage against the retirees. A decision by
a court that allows the limitation or extermination of benefits at the end of a
collective bargaining agreement can lead to an employer trying to limit
benefits in broader situations, or trying to eliminate them altogether -
something many employers have already attempted. 204 The less the retirees
receive, the easier it is to take from them in the future. Baby boomers are
201 See Int'l Union v. Yard-Man, Inc., 716 F.2d 1476, 1480 (6th Cir. 1983) ("[T]he collective
bargaining agreement's terms must be construed so as to render non nugatory and avoid illusory
promises.").
202 See id. at 1481.
203 See id
204 ROTHSTEIN & LIEBMAN, supra note 3, at 1239. Even the words "lifetime benefits" do not mean
anything in certain courts. See also Vallone v. CNA Fin. Corp., 375 F.3d 623, 633 (7th Cir. 2004),
which notes that "the problem for the plaintiffs is that 'lifetime' may be construed as 'good for life
unless revoked or modified."' Id. at 633. The court found summary judgment in favor of the defendant
company, when a collective bargaining agreement that called for "lifetime benefits" for its employees
was subject to elimination of those "lifetime" benefits if the company wanted to alter it. Id. at 634. The
court did not find the existence of both a reservation rights clause and a promise of "lifetime benefits"
to be enough of an ambiguity to defeat the presumption that the Seventh Circuit holds against the
vesting of benefits. Id. This decision, while contractually sound, makes things much tougher for the
retirees who took early retirement, believing that they were signing up for lifetime benefits. Id. at 642;
Jennifer Claire Sprague, How Secure are Your Lifetime Benefits?, 30 S. ILL. U. L. 195, 217-18 (2005).
The court in Vallone even noted how the wording of the contract might have been difficult. See Vallone,
375 F.3d at 642.
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reaching retirement age and will soon be flooding the retirement system.205
American employers will have to make decisions about how, or whether, to
provide benefits for the influx of retirees, and limiting or eliminating
benefits altogether are growing possibilities.206 When a company like
General Motors can cut health benefits for retirees, it can open the door for
countless other companies to enhance their cost-cutting measures to the
detriment of those who have dedicated their lives to the companies. 207 One
GM employee said, "In 34 years with General Motors, I had many
opportunities to go in other directions that were much more lucrative, but
the promise of health care and pension for life was something that I had to
consider." 208 Retirees have falsely been led to believe that they have
earned some security and protection in their later years, but now they are
forced to fear for what else can be taken away from them.
CONCLUSION
When people retire, they want, and often expect, benefits that will last
for the lifetime of their retirement. This seems to be a thing of the past, as
older workers and retirees face tough roads ahead. Employers' greed and
negligence towards retirees is partially responsible, but employers cannot
solely be blamed for the lack of support for retirees; current employeeS209
and the government play a hand as well. 210 The difficult economic
landscape of the past several years leaves everyone in the working world in
an unpredictable lurch, but everyone points the finger at everyone else. 211
205 See supra notes 6-13, and accompanying text (discussing baby-boomers).
206 See supra notes 11-13 (explaining how General Motors' decisions are hurting retirees).
207 See supra notes 11-13 (showing the trend of employees receiving a declining percentage of
income from employer pension plans and retirement savings plans since 1990).
208 Nick Bunkley, Some White Collar G.M Retirees Scramble as Health Care is Cut Off, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 10, 2008, at B 1.
209 See supra notes 173-190 and accompanying text.
210 For example, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation only guarantees $4,500 per month in
2009. See PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY CORPORATION, Maximum Monthly Guarantee Tables,
http://www.pbgc.gov/workers-retirees/benefits-information/content/page789.html#2009 (last visited
Feb. 20, 2011). While that it is better than nothing, it does not do much to halt the financial worries and
concerns for aging retiring employees. See id; Javier C. Hernandez, Bill Would Extend Time to Fund
Pension Plans, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2009, at B4.
211 Catherine Fisk, Lochner Redux: The Renaissance of Laissez-Faire Contract in the Federal
Common Law of Employee Benefits, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 153, 166 (1995) ("Given that employee
expectations of continued health coverage are being disappointed ... Congress may have expected the
courts to fashion protections," but "because Congress did not create protections, the courts have seemed
to assume that employees were to be left unprotected."); Jana K. Strain & Eleanor D. Kinney, The Road
Paved with Good Intentions: Problems and Potential for Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance Under
ERISA, 31 LOy. U. CHI. L.J. 29, 44-45 (1999) (describing the 105th Congress' failure to pass serious
reform of ERISA due to the finger-pointing between members of Congress).
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Unfortunately, retirees are easy targets when cuts have to be made because
they are often out of sight, and out of mind, with little clout.
As the Yard-Man opinion said, retirement benefits are status benefits. 212
People retire for life. It is hard to imagine that many of them would sign up
for particular retirement benefits if those benefits were only designed to last
three years, but that is what many courts have held.213 When collective
bargaining agreements end, and the language is ambiguous or silent as to
whether retiree health benefits under the agreement vest, the courts have
traditionally recognized either a presumption against vesting, or a contract-
style interpretation of the agreement to determine the intent of the parties
on the issue. A third method should be adopted in those situations: a
presumption in favor of the vesting of retirement benefits.
The Yard-Man decision more than 25 years ago, and those cases that
have followed, have held on to humanity and awarded aging workers with
the respect that they have earned. Although the Sixth Circuit has refused to
claim that it is rightfully applying a presumption in favor of the vesting
retirement benefits, it should continue what it is doing, because it is indeed
creating a presumption in favor of vesting for retirees. 214
212 See Int'l Union, UAW v. Yard-Man, Inc, 716 F.2d 1476, 1482 (6th Cir. 1983) ("[R]etiree
benefits are in a sense 'status' benefits.").
213 See supra Part H, B
214 See supra Part IV.
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